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group to support progressive and reform legislation: "cumulatively at least the Scan-
dinavian Americans emerge as an easily identifiable force on the side of progressive 
refo1m" (240). In accounting for this, Br!llndal notes that "the regional and the Scan-
dinavian-American factors overlapped: many westerners were progressives, and 
many Scandinavian-American legislators were westerns" (241 ). ln addition, western 
Scandinavian Americans were more progressive than both the ir neighboring legisla-
tors and fellow ethnics from other parts of Wisconsin. He then makes a case for fac-
toring in the temperance movement into this progressive inc lination, showing its 
widespread popularity particularly among western Scandinavian Americans. But he 
must again council caution when drawing conclusions about Scandinavian-American 
values as such, given that this was a regional phenomenon and because "neither was 
the coincidence between progressive inclinations and pro-temperance attitudes com-
plete, nor was the connection simple and direct" (244). 
To sum up, J0m Br¢ndal has wri tten an extremely well-researched, extensive, and 
path-breaking history of the Scandinavian-American political leadership in the years 
1890 to 1914. Its great virtue lies in its comparative structure when examining the 
development of a Scandinavian-American identity, its analysis of the entrance of 
Scandinavian-American politic ians into the associational political party framework in 
Wisconsin, and in showing the manner in which the Progressive Movement modified 
this framework and the participation of the Scandinavian-American community in it. 
If it is less successful in pinning down the connection between Scandinavian-Amer-
ican values and the Progressive Movement, it is not for lack of systematic effort, but 
rather because this is intrinsically such a difficult task. Ethnic Leadership and Mid-
western Politics. Scandinavian Americans and the Progressive Movement in Wis-
consin, 1890-1914 richly deserves the 2005 Wisconsin Historical Society Book 
Award of Merit. 
Robert Mikkelsen 0 stfold University College 
Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First 
Century. New York: GP Putnam's Sons, 2004. 449 pages; fSBN 0399151753; $ 
26.95. 
I have a friend named Larry Belle. Larry plays a special role in my life. He's the guy 
who brings me back to reality when I offer politically - or historically - unsupported 
opinions, which T do all the time. I praise the American medical system. He asks why 
Americans have the highest infant-mortality rates among industrial nations. He does 
that sort of thing with everything. I hate to admit it, but he's usually right. 
And that's why I thought of Larry when I read Thomas Barnett's The Pentagon's New 
Map. In the area of military strategy, Barnett takes what most of us think we know 
and turns it on its head. He may not always be con-ect, but he offers the most creative 
and important critique of military policy that I've read in years. 
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Barnett, a naval analyst who spent a decade in the Pentagon before moving to the 
Naval War College in Newport, R.I., argues that the way the US has prepared for past 
wars with its hugely expensive toys is no longer relevant. With the USSR now a 
fading bad dream, the Pentagon's big-ship navy officers have been gearing up to fight 
China a decade or two from now. Wrong, says Barnett, the U.S. will never fight 
China. Pentagon planners arc drafting contingency plans to fight the wrong enemy. 
Nor, he argues, will Ame1icans ever again fight any genuinely modern country with a 
powerful army and navy. What he means is that the world is increasingly divided into 
two main regions. One he calls the "functioning Core" (that's mainly Europe, China, 
North America, and Brazil and Argentina in South America). Countries within the 
Core are what he calls the "includeds," because they are indeed included in the frame-
work of globalization. The rest of the world, comprising about two-thirds of its six-
billion people, is the "non-integrating Gap," what Barnett refers to as the " lesser-
includeds." These are the societies that remain unstable and hostile. The threat to 
moderni ty and to peace comes from this "Gap." The Pentagon 's new map helps us to 
visualize the Core and the Gap. 
What makes the Core into "the includeds" is not so much wealth (though wealth has 
a lot to do with it) as "connectedness." The Core includes all those who are connected 
by trade and cyber-communications, and by certain values, including a respect for 
women. In fact, argues Barnett in one of his many insightful paragraphs, we can judge 
the modern world's fault lines based less on the shape of a country's political system 
than the degree to which it isolates its women from "everyday life," especially eco-
nomic life. How do we identify that isolation? In honor killings of women who 
commit adultery, in refusing to permit women to drive, or hold public office, or to get 
a decent education. With women non-producing (except for babies) and non-con-
suming, these Gap countries will be economically stagnant, and therefore increas-
ingly rusconnected from the global economy. 
Well , yes and no. Saddam Hussein's lraq was much more egalitarian and secular in its 
attitude toward women than most states in the Arab world, but Barnett is on target 
about the Taliban and sub-Sahara Africa and many other likely trouble spots. This 
book is nothing if not provocative. 
Barnett, remember, is a military strategist, not a sociologist or historian. As a strate-
gist, he views the U.S. for the foreseeable future as having not a key military role, but 
the key military role. Americans, he argues, should continue to be the world's 
policemen. He sees this as inevitable. He is insistent (much too insistent, in my esti-
mation) that the U.S. is not an imperial power. He argues that an empire enforces 
what he calls "maximum rule sets" which require other societies to do what they are 
told to do. Not so the U.S., he claims, where Washington enforces "minimum rule 
sets" which merely define what others cannot do, such as invade their neighbors or 
sponsor terrorist activity. 
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Because the U.S. should enforce order to promote connectivity, he argues that the 
Americans must construct- more accurately, reconstruct- a military that can respond 
flexibly in the Gap, not just to fight wars, but to maintain a truly just peace. He has 
little use for arms limitation agreements, for he believes that they are no longer rele-
vant. They are unnecessary, he asserts, because he believes that there will be no more 
wars among Core states, while countries in the Gap, like Iran and North Korea, will 
simply ignore them. Barnett more or less updates John Cobdcn's nineteenth-century 
free-trade theory by asserting that core-stales can ' t afford to fight (he is surprisingly 
persuasive in arguing that a U.S.-China clash is unlikely despite quan els over every-
thing from Taiwan to spy-planes). Reminding us that the U.S. and the USSR never 
exchanged nuclear missiles during the Cold War, he is insistent that core states are 
just not going to engage in self-destructive behavior. 
On the other hand , in dealing with the Gap, the so-called lesser-includeds, he argues 
that the use of American military force (American, because no other states will have 
the means to apply military power effectively) will remain absolutely necessary in the 
foreseeable future. It will be necessary because the U.S. must, he believes, guarantee 
stability and the economic and social conditions that promote connectedness. 
And it is here that we come back to the heart of Barnett's book. What Barnell seeks is 
not American hegemony for its own sake, nor imperial privilege. What he wants is, in 
his words, a "future worth bui lding," by which he means a world in which the lesser-
includeds are increasingly connected to the developed world in a way that increases 
their chances of living in peace, that increases their standard of living, that increases 
the life-expectancy of their citizens along with their mutual dependence and dignity. 
It is Barnett 's view of American goals, built firmly upon Enlightenment ideals of 
tolerance and individual rights, that separates his work from the garden variety apol-
ogists for American power. His idealism is palpable. Tt is also worth noting that Bar-
nell rejects Samuel Huntington's belief that civilizations will clash. Just the opposi te, 
claims Barnett, because bui lding connections between peoples will insure that they 
will not clash. The Pentagon's new map outlines only two transnational systems, 
those states that are connected to each other, and those that are not. He virtually 
ignores racia l, religious, and ethnic divisions. 
Nor, he believes, will Gap states - and perhaps even individuals (like Bin Laden) in 
those states - dare to res ist American force because the U.S. will apply force so effec-
tively. He calls this "exporLing security." American power, he writes, "armed with 
moral principle , should equal a real grand strategy. America ultimately does not trans-
form the Middle East to defeat terrorism, contain Islam, secure oil, or defend Israel. 
We seek to transform the region to end its disconnectedness, and if it is worth doing 
there, then it is worth doing everywhere it exists" (330-31). 
Barnett is the quintessential American. His book paradoxically combines a lot of 
Wilsonian idealism with George Kennan realism. It is unfai lingly optimistic. It con-
tains freshness, clear-headedness, and a kind of simple honesty that makes it more 
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persuasive than it probably should be. During the very week that I write this review, 
Chinese demonstrators are shattering windows in Japanese-owned firms as the 
demonstrators protest Tokyo's refusal to acknowledge adequately its World War ll 
crimes in China. But Barnett would likely respond that despite the demonstrations, 
there will be no hostilities. He would point to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi 's 
apology for those crimes as evidence lhal while political and cultural differences 
linger, both governments understand that the connections are more powerful than his-
torical animosity. And, he would argue, if that is true in the Far East, it is equally true 
in Scandinavia and Central Europe and elsewhere. 
But, like most of us, Barnett is selective. Missing in this otherwise brilliant book 
advocating c01mectedness is the unilateralism that has characterized the recent policy 
of Barnett's own govenunent as expressed in the rejection of not just the Kyoto global 
warming treaty, but proposed international agreements regarding the International 
Criminal Court, landmines, children in war, nuclear testing, chemical and biological 
weapons, biodiversity, and much more. Missing, too, is the surge of American evan-
gelical fervor that parallels the very fundamentalism that he believes helps lo explain 
the disconnectedness in the Middle East. And missing is the real influence of the oil 
and other lobbyists that cynically undermine the idealism of writers like Barnett. 
I just wished that r shared Barne tt's optim ism. He would probably dismiss my anxiety 
as that of a historian, like those admirals, who arc blinded by history. I hope he, like 
my friend Larry Belle, is right. 
Gary B. Ostrower Arhus University (visiting lecturer)/ Alfred University, NY 
Ira Berlin, Generations of Captivity: A History of African-American Slaves. Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 2003. 374 pages; ISBN 06740 106 12 hardcover; $29.95. 
The historiography of American slavery has expanded dramatically in recent decades. 
Whi le Ulrich Bonnell Phillips's American Negro Slavery (1918) almost single-
handedly constituted the first phase of the field 's modem development, and Kermeth 
M. Stampp's The Peculiar Institution (1956) and Stanley Elkins's Slavery (195 8) 
epitomized the second stage, the third phase - which began in the 1970s with the 
works of John W. Blassingame, Eugene D. Genovese, Robert William Fogel, Stanley 
L. Engerman, and Herbert Gutman - rolled into the twenty-first century on an impres-
sive growth curve. Conu·ibuting to this development, Ira Berlin 's Generations of 
Captivity (2003) is an excellent up-to-dale overview of the Pecul iar Jnstilution that 
both draws on and temporally expands the scope of his earlier prize-winning study 
Many Thousands Gone (1998). 
J mportant as they were, the early works of the field's third phase - for example, Ge-
novese 's Roll, .Tordan., Roll (1974), a massive compendium of the Southern way of 
